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Countertrends in Financial Provisions For
the Protection of Corporate Creditors: The




Distributions and payments of dividends by corporations to their
shareholders are likely to cause a conflict of interest between shareholders
and general creditors of a corporation. Shareholders generally expect a
return on their investments as an enterprise earns profit, while creditors
desire that an enterprise have substantial assets available for so long a
time as their claims have not been paid.1
There are several alternative means to deal with the conflict. This
article will focus on one in particular: corporate law restrictions on finan-
cial distributions to shareholders.' The goal of this article is to articulate
trends in the applicable laws of the United States and E.E.C. Countries.
3
An analysis of these laws indicates that two countertrends can be dis-
cerned in the main bodies of laws governing corporations in the United
States and the E.E.C. Countries. In particular, the second corporate
E.E.C. Council Directive (1976) contains 44 articles on the raising and
maintenance of share capital,4 while the 1979 amendments to the final
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1. B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPrrAL, 1-15 (2d. ed. 1981); Kummert,
State Statutory Restrictions on Financial Distributions by Corporations to Shareholders,
59 WASH. L. REV. 185, 189-193 (1984).
2. Restrictions that result from the operation of the state's fraudulent conveyance rules
will be covered only where necessary. For a discussion of these restrictions see Clark, The
Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REV. 505 (1977). See also
Kummert, supra note 1, at 266-282.
3. This evolution was primarily inspired by the Second Council Directive of 13 Decem-
ber 1976, on coordination of safeguards which are required by Member States of companies
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty. 20 0. J. EUR. COMM.
No. 126, 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Second Council Directive].
4. Morse, The Second Directive: Raising and Maintenance of Capital, 2 EUR. L. REV.
126 (1977); Yates III, European Directives on Formation and Operation of Companies and
the Role of the Lawyer, in VA. LEGAL STUDIES, HARMONIZATION OP LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN
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provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) have elimi-
nated "the outmoded concepts of stated capital and par value. '
This article will present an overview of the basic terminology and
operation of the statutory "legal capital" systems. The article will then
examine solutions adopted by the revisors of the MBCA, by the state of
California and other states that followed in the wake of these changes.
For comparative purposes, the requirements for the protection of credi-
tors in the E.E.C. Countries will be discussed. It will be pointed out that
European legislators have created more severe requirements than their
U.S. counterparts for the raising and maintenance of a minimum capital,
which serves as a trust fund for the protection of creditors.
Finally, the author will propose a new solution to the conflict of in-
terest between shareholders and general creditors of a corporation, fol-
lowing the examples of the California Corporation Code and the MBCA
in so far as they are based on financial ratio tests.
II. THE MBCA
The MBCA provides the basis for the corporation laws of a majority
of states within the United States. 6 At a meeting on December 8, 1979,
the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association (Sec-
tion on Corporation, Banking and Business Law) adopted far-reaching re-
visions to the financial provisions of the MBCA which have been made
COMMUNITIES 113, 118 (1983).
5. Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act - Amendments to Financial Provi-
sions, A Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws, 34 Bus. LAW. 1867 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Amendments]. See text accompanying notes 44-55.
6. The Model Business Corporations Act has served as the basis for corporate codes in
more than twenty five states and was employed to a great extent in the drafting of the
corporate law statutes of about ten other states. 1 MODEL BUSIxNESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 2,
comment 4 (1971); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 1, comment 1 (1973 Supp.); MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 1, comment 1 (1977 Supp.); See Cohn, Capital Structure, Divi-
dends and Redemption - Time for a Change to Florida's Corporate Code, 56 FLA. B.J. 574,
577 n.2 (1982); Murphy, Redemption of Stock Under the Model Business Corporation Act
and the Virginia Stock Corporation Act, 14 U. RICH. L. REv. 311 (1981); Branson, Counter-
trends in Corporation Law: Model Business Corporation Act Revision, British Company
Law Reform, and Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure, 68 MINN. L. Rav. 53,
57 (1983); Kummert, supra note 1, at 195; B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 73 and 165; The
Model Business Corporation Act was prepared by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the
Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association. A first
draft of a model business corporation act (1946) was patterned on the 1933 Illinois Business
Corporation Act. A version in 1950, which largely superseded the first draft, was given wide
publicity and may be regarded as the basis of the present Model Business Corporation Act.
For the text of the 1950 version, preceded by comments on the early drafts, see Garrett,
History, Purpose and Summary of the Model Business Corporation Act, 6 Bus. LAW. 1
(1950); see also Garrett, The Model Business Corporation Act, 4 BAYLOR L. REv. 412 (1952);
Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act - Invitation to Irresponsibility?, 50 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1 (1955); Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Pro-
tection, 23 LAW & CONTEMn'. PROBS. 193, 197 (1958).
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part of the overall revision of the Act in 1984, after only minor changes. 7
To date, very few states have adopted the revised MBCA. The majority of
states have corporation laws based on the old MBCA and its
predecessors.
A. Statutory "Legal Capital" Systems
The concepts of "legal capital," "par value," "stated capital," and
"capital surplus," contained in the modern corporation codes of most
states are the direct product of nineteenth century legal history.8 In the
nineteenth century, "par value" was the minimum value that a share-
holder was required to have paid for each share of corporate stock.9 The
product of the par value of each share times the number of shares of
stock issued and outstanding was called the corporation's "capital" or
"stated capital."' 0 If the shares were authorized at a low value, and sold
well in excess of it, they were called "low par stock.""' Consideration re-
ceived in excess of the par value was separately disclosed on the balance
sheet as "capital surplus," "capital in excess of par value" or "additional
paid-in capital.'
' 2
Par value is no longer an indication of the price at which shares are
issued. Today, the only important function of par value is that considera-
tion at least equal to par must be paid in under the statutes. If the assets
paid in for shares are valued at an amount less than par, the shares are
called "watered stock."'" Most statutes permit a statutory obligation to
pay in par value to be enforced in some circumstances by creditors,"
7. Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act - Amendments to Financial Provi-
sion, A Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws, 35 Bus. LAW. 1365 (1980); T. FIFLIS,
H. KRIPKE, P. FOSTER, AccouNTIN FOR BusINss LAWYERS, 431 (3rd ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as T. FIFLIS]; R. HAMILTON, CORPORTION FINANCE, 114 (1984); Murphy, Equity Insol-
vency and the New Model Business Corporation Act, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 839 (1981); Ral-
ston, The 1980 Amendments to the Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act: A Positive Alternative to the New York Statutory Reform, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1019,
1021-1022 (1983); B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 165; Kummert, supra note 1, at 187 n.4;
Cohn, supra note 6, at 578 n. 32; Murphy, supra note 6, 312 n.3; Amendments supra note 5.
The official text and comments of the 1984 overall revision of the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act were published in 1985 as the REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. Throughout
this text, the latest 1984 version of the Model Business Corporation Act is referred to as the
"MBCA." The version of the sections as they existed prior to the 1979 amendments is re-
ferred to as the "old MBCA."
8. Cohn, supra note 6, 574; The concepts and their history are discussed extensively in
B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 1-108.
9. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 20; T. FiFLis, supra note 7, at 426.
10. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 30; Cohn, supra note 6, at 574.
11. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 24.
12. S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, ACCOUrTING AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, 98-99 (1983) B.
MANNING, supra note 1, at 36; Cohn, supra note 6, at 574; Ralston, supra note 7, at 1023.
13. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 20; R. HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 66; T. FIFLIS, supra
note 7, at 426; S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, supra note 12, at 97.
14. Hackney & Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PITT. L.
REV. 837, 839 (1982); B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 46.
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shareholders, 5 or the corporation."'
Since the beginning of this century" more and more states have per-
mitted the issuance of "no par stock" (i.e. stock with no dollar amount
printed on the share certificate). No par stock may be issued for whatever
consideration the board of directors determines." The statutes, however,
require that the board of directors "state" a capital number on the bal-
ance sheet..9 This number, whether or not it follows directly from the par
value of the shares is called the "legal capital" or "stated capital". Some
statutes prescribe a minimum initial capitalization;" which is typically a
requirement to pay in a small amount of money, very often $500 or
$1,000."1 Most of these pro forma requirements have been abolished dur-
ing the last few years."
A shareholder has no financial obligation or liability to the corpora-
tion or its creditors with respect to his shares, other than the obligation
to pay the consideration for which his shares were issued." The legal cap-
ital required by law is designed to be a safeguard for creditors.2 4 But in
some cases, particularly where the corporation is "grossly undercapital-
ized," this limited liability may be disregarded.' 5
Many states base restrictions on corporate distributions on the con-
cept of legal capital. In effect, this concept asserts that a corporation, in
order to protect its creditors, should not pay any dividend to its share-
holders if the result would be to reduce the corporation's assets below the
aggregate par or stated value of issued shares.' The problems involved in
15. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 53.
16. Id. at 56.
17. Id. at 25.
18. Cohn, supra note 6, at 574; T. FiLIs, supra note 7, at 427; S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL,
supra note 12, at 97.
19. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 26; Cohn, supra note 6, at 574; S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL,
supra note 12, at 97. Some statutes treat stated value like par: if the stated value is not
paid-in, it will be possible to enforce payment of the stated value. T. FIFLIS, supra note 7, at
427.
20. R. HAMILTON, supra note 6, at 56.
21. 2 MODEL BusIN'ss CORP. AcT ANN., 174, § 54, V 3.03(7) (1971). Usually there was no
provision prohibiting an immediate return of this amount to the shareholders. B. MANNING,
supra note 1, at 17.
22. The old MBCA contained such a provision, but it was eliminated in 1969. 2 MODEL
BusINEss CORP. AcT ANN. § 54, V 3.03(7) (1971); Scott, Changes in the Model Business Cor-
poration Act, 24 Bus. LAW. 291, 300 (1968); R. HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 56; Branson,
supra note 6, at 77.
23. 1 MODEL BusINEss CORP. AcT ANN. § 25 (1971); Hackney & Benson, supra note 14,
at 839.
24. Hackney, Accounting Principles in Corporation Law, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
791, 799 (1965).
25. See Comment, Limited Limited Liability, A Definitive Judicial Standard for the
Inadequate Capitalization Problem, 47 TEMP. L. Q. 321 (1974); Hackney & Benson, supra
note 14, 837-901; see infra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
26. Kummert, supra note 1, at 194; B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 30; T. FIFLIS, supra
note 7, at 432; Hackney, supra note 24, at 799.
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determining the legality of distributions under these statutes are gener-
ally seen as among the most confusing and complex in the entire field of
corporate law." The statutory provisions differ from state to state and
contain different tests. It will be useful to mention the most important
forms of state legislation which impose restrictions on corporate
distributions.
1. Insolvency Statute
Massachusetts appears to be the only state which has only one statu-
tory limitation on distributions of assets to shareholders. The Massachu-
setts corporation statute imposes liability on directors of a corporation
who distribute dividends "if the corporation is insolvent or is rendered
insolvent by the making of any such distribution. . ". ."" This provision
is generally seen as the most lenient in terms of restricting distributions.
It dispenses entirely with concepts of capital, legal capital, par value, sur-
plus or any other accounting terms. Most corporation laws of other states
contain similar provisions, but only in combination with one or more of
the tests discussed in the following sections.2 9
2. Balance Sheet Surplus Statutes
The New York Business Corporation Law is a good example of a bal-
ance sheet surplus statute. Section 510(b) reads as follows:
Dividends may be declared or paid and other distributions may be
made out of surplus only, so that the net assets of the corporation
remaining after such declaration, payment or distribution shall at
least equal the amount of its stated capital."
The effect of this test is that dividends may be paid out of net assets
in excess of legal capital.3 1 These provisions rely heavily on accounting
concepts that determine whether there is a surplus.32
3. Earned Surplus Statutes
According to these statutes, distributions of assets to shareholders
27. R. HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 84.
28. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 61 (West 1964); Current Issues on the Legality
of Dividends From a Law and Accounting Perspective: a Task Force Report, 39 Bus. LAW.
289, 304 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report]. See also Colorado Corp. Code,
C.R.S. § 7-5-110(1) (1973).
29. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 59; Cohn, supra note 6, at 575; R. HAMILTON, supra
note 7, at 85; T. FIFLIS, supra note 7, at 441.
30. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510(b) (Consol. 1982). More than fifteen states use this test
as the central restriction on distributions of assets. E.g. C.R.S. § 7-5-110(d) (1973); Kum-
inert, supra note 1, at 211. For a definition of stated capital see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
102(a)(12) (Consol. 1982); MICH. Coup. LAWS § 450.1109(3) (1970); 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT ANN. § 2(j) (1971).
31. T. FIFLIS, supra note 7, at 434.
32. S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, supra note 12, at 99.
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have to be limited to situations in which an enterprise has accumulated
earnings. The old MBCA is often described as an earned surplus stat-
ute."3 Section 45(a) of the old MBCA permits dividends to be declared
and paid in cash or property out of the unreserved and unrestricted
earned surplus. 4 Earned surplus consists of the accumulated and undis-
tributed earnings of the corporation. 5
This limitation seems to provide adequate protection for creditors.
However, according to section 46 of the old MBCA, a corporation may
under certain conditions distribute cash or property out of capital sur-
plus." This "exception" is probably based on the idea that it is only the
par value of the corporation's stock that serves to protect the creditors.3 7
Capital surplus which can be generated quite easily by a reduction of par
or other reduction of stated capital can be used as an offset to a deficit in
the earned surplus account.3 8
4. Nimble Dividend Statutes
Section 170 of the Delaware corporation statute permits a corpora-
tion to pay dividends in situations where there will be no surplus. These
dividends are paid out of net profits for the fiscal year in which the divi-
dend is declared and/or the preceding fiscal year. Dividends can be paid
33. Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 70
HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1366-1367 (1957); B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 73; Murphy, supra note
6, at 315; T. FIFLIS, supra note 7, at 436.
34. 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 45(a) (1971).
35. For the complete definition see 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 2(1) (1971).
36. In part, section 46 of the old Model Act states:
(a) No such distribution shall be made at a time when the corporation is
insolvent or when such distribution would render the corporation insolvent.
(b) No such distribution shall be made unless the articles of incorporation
so provide or such distribution is authorized by the affirmative vote of the
holders of a majority of the outstanding shares of each class whether or not
entitled to vote thereon by the provisions of the articles of incorporation of the
corporations.
(c) No such distribution shall be made to the holders of any class of shares
unless all cumulative dividends accrued on all preferred or special classes of
shares entitled to preferential dividends shall have been fully paid.
(d) No such distribution shall be made to the holders of any class of shares
which would reduce the remaining net assets of the corporation below the ag-
gregate preferential amount payable in event of involuntary liquidation to the
holders of shares having preferential rights to the assets of the corporation in
the event of liquidation.
(e) Each such distribution, when made, shall be identified as a distribution
from the capital surplus and the amount per share disclosed to the sharehold-
ers receiving the same concurrently with the distribution thereof.
1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 46 (1971). See also Kummert, supra note 1, at 196;
Murphy, supra note 6, at 316 n. 10.
37. S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, supra note 12, at 99.
38. See 2 MODEL BusINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 70 (1971); B. MANNING, supra note 1, at
72-75,125; Hackney, supra note 33, at 1381.
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out even if the deficits of previous years have not yet been eliminated.3 9
This approach can be risky for creditors because this provision allows
future dividends to be paid despite accumulated past deficits. However, it
does allow a corporation that has accumulated large losses to attract new
equity capital. If this new capital infusion can help a company avoid
bankruptcy, the creditors certainly would be better off. But even then, it
would be preferable to allow "nimble" dividends only up to a limited por-
tion, such as fifty percent of the current earnings, and to require that the
other part of these earnings be used to reduce the existing deficit.
B. New Financial Provisions
The reformation of state statutes that regulate payments by corpora-
tions to their shareholders began with the adoption by the California leg-
islature of the California General Corporations Law.'0 The fundamental
limitation on corporate distributions has been retained in Section 501 of
the California Corporation Code which provides that no distribution may
be made if the corporation is, or as a result of the distribution would be
unable to pay its debts as they mature."'
The California statute further prohibits any distribution to the cor-
poration's shareholders unless: (a) the corporation has retained earnings
at least equal to the amount of the proposed distribution,"2 or (b) the
corporation, after the distribution, has (1) assets at least equal to 1 /4
times its liabilities, and (2) current assets at least equal to its current
liabilities. If the corporation's earnings for the two preceding fiscal years
before taxes on income and interest expense are less than its interest ex-
pense for those same years, its current assets must at least be equal to 1
/ times its liabilities.' These tests are in fact financial ratios used to
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §170 (1980); see also T. FIFLIS, supra note 7, at 434; B.
MANNING, supra note 1, at 76-77.
40. See Act of Sept. 12, 1975, ch. 682, 1975 CAL. STAT. 1514. The amendment of the
financial provisions was the most revolutionary part of an overall revision of the California
Corporation Code. The new California General Corporation Law took effect on January 1,
1977.
41. CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (Deering 1977). This is called the equity insolvency test,
which is concerned with liquidity. Equity insolvency can be defined as the inability to pay
debts as they become due. The bankruptcy insolvency test is concerned with liquidation and
compares the total dollar amount of the assets with the total dollar amount of the liabilities.
There is bankruptcy insolvency if the total liabilities exceed the total assets. See Ben-Dror,
An Empirical Study of Distribution Rules Under California Corporations Code 500: Are
Creditors Adequately Protected?, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 375, 380 (1983); B. MANNING, supra
note 1, at 59-60.
42. CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(a) (Deering 1977).
43. CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(b) (Deering 1977). Assets are defined as "exclusive of good-
will, capitalized research and development expenses and deferred charges" and liabilities as
"not including deferred taxes, deferred income and other deferred credits." For more exten-
sive discussions of these provisions, see 2 H. MARSH, CA. CORP. LAW AND PRACTICE, § 13.1-
13.30 (1982); R. CLARK, 1 CA. CORP. LAWS, §§ 141-148 (1984); Ackerman, Jr., California's
New Approach to Dividends and Reacquisitions of Shares, 23 UCLA L. REV. 1052 (1976);
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determine the solvency of the corporation. The "revolution" started by
the California legislation was continued some years later when the finan-
cial provisions of the old MBCA were amended. Today's MBCA contains
comparable, but different provisions.
44
Shortly after the adoption of the 1979 amendments, the Committee
on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association began a major pro-
ject to update, restate and revise all provisions of the MBCA. A final ver-
sion was approved in 1984 and published in 1985. As mentioned earlier,
this revision contains no substantial changes to the 1979 amendment.4 5
Illinois, Montana and New Mexico have already enacted all or some of
the new provisions in their corporation law."'
The most important change made by the amendments to the MBCA
was the elimination of par value, stated capital and surplus.47 The use in
the articles of incorporation of provisions concerning par value (for
whatever purposes desired, not inconsistent with the statute) is op-
tional.48 The purchasing shareholder has no other obligation to the corpo-
ration nor to its creditors than to pay the consideration for which the
shares were authorized to be issued or which is specified in the subscrip-
tion agreement.4" No certificate shall be issued for any share before the
board of directors determines that the consideration received or to be re-
ceived for the shares is adequate. 50 There is no requirement of minimum
initial capitalization.
Central to the changes is the introduction of a new concept termed
"distribution," and the revision of the rules regulating dividends and
purchases by a corporation of its own shares and distributions in liquida-
tions. According to the Act, stock dividends and stock splits are not "dis-
tributions." They are mere changes in the unit of interests.5' Section
6.40(c) of the MBCA imposes a uniform test on all distributions. A corpo-
Dreyfuss, Distributions to Shareholders Under the New California General Corporation
Law, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 839 (1976); Kummert, supra note 1, at 226-242; Ben-Dror, supra
note 41.
44. See Ben-Dror, supra note 41, at 377 n.22 and 381-383.
45. See supra note 7.
46. Illinois, ILL.ANN.STAT. ch. 32P. § 9.15 (1985); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-
11-44 (1983); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-711 (1983).
47. Amendments, supra note 5, at 1869-1872; See also supra notes 35-37 and accompa-
nying text.
48. Amendments, supra note 5, at 1887. Of course, many charter documents will not be
changed and continue to contain references to par value.
49. REVISED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT § 6.22(a) (1985). Compare with section 25 of
the old MBCA, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
50. REVISED MODEL BusiNiss CORP. AcT § 6.21(c) (1985).
51. REVISED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT § 1.40(6) (1985). A "distribution" is defined as:
"direct or indirect transfer of money or other property (except its own shares) or incurrence
of indebtedness, by a corporation to or for the benefit of any of its shareholders in respect of
any of its shares. A distribution may be in the form of a declaration or payment of a divi-
dend, a purchase, redemption, or other acquisition of shares, a distribution of indebtedness
or otherwise."
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ration may not make a proposed distribution if either: (1) the corporation
would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course
of its business, or (2) the corporation's total assets would be less than the
sum of its total liabilities (unless the articles of incorporation permit oth-
erwise) plus the amount that then would be needed to satisfy the prefer-
ential rights upon dissolution of shareholders whose preferential rights
are superior to those receiving the distribution."2 This test is in fact a
dual insolvency test which prohibits any distribution that causes either
"equity insolvency," or "bankruptcy insolvency. 5 3
Determination that a distribution may be made under section 6.40(c)
of the MBCA may be based on financial statements prepared on the basis
of accounting practices and principles, on a fair valuation, or on other
methods that are reasonable under the circumstances." Section 6.40(e)
also provides the effective date by which the distribution is to be
measured. 55
III. CORPORATION LAW IN THE E.E.C. COUNTRIES
Corporation Law in the E.E.C. Countries is heavily influenced by
Community Directives. After giving an overview of the basis in the E.E.C.
Treaty 6 for the directives and their operation in general, we will discuss
in detail the different directive requirements protecting general creditors.
It will be clear that the European system is similar to the U.S. systems of
legal capital in many ways. However, the European system has more
stringent requirements for the raising and maintenance of minimum capi-
tal than its United States counterparts.
A. Harmonization of Corporate Laws in the E.E.C.
One aspect of the E.E.C.'s goal to permit the free movement of per-
sons, services and capital among Member States is what the E.E.C.
Treaty terms the right of establishment. This right comprises the free-
dom of a national company of any Member State to establish or maintain
a business in any of the other Member States. The E.E.C. Council of
Ministers has the power to issue directives to the Member States in order
to secure freedom of establishment by means of coordinating some as-
pects of the national corporation laws of the Member States.57 Although
52. REVISED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT § 6.40(c) (1985).
53. See supra note 41.
54. REvisED MODEL BusINEss CoRP. ACT § 6.40(d) (1985).
55. For further discussion of the MBCA: B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 165-180; Kum-
inert, supra note 1, at 242-256; Cohn, supra note 6, at 576-578; Murphy, supra note 7, at
839-871; Ralston, supra note 7, at 1019-1049.
56. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, art.
85, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter referred to as E.E.C. Treaty].
57. Id. arts. 53(3)(g), 54(2). For a more detailed analysis of the legal foundation of these
measures in the E.E.C. Treaty, see Schneebaum, Company Law Harmonization Program of
the European Community, 14 LAW. & POL'Y. INT'L Bus. 293, 293-300 (1982); Wooldridge,
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directives are binding upon each Member State to which it is addressed,
"as to the result to be achieved,"' 8 the directives claim to leave the na-
tional authorities the choice of form and methods, but in practice they
often leave little discretion as to the manner of their implementation.9
A plan of company law harmonization has been developed and partly
executed in the E.E.C. Countries. This plan covers diverse aspects of cor-
porate operations including disclosure of information, capitalization,
mergers, public offerings of securities, qualification of auditors and rela-
tionships within "groups" of corporations.6 0 Those areas of law which are
not governed by implementation within the national laws of any directive
are still governed by the national laws and regulations of each Member
State."'
B. The Second Council Directive
Distribution to shareholders in E.E.C. Countries is primarily regu-
lated by the Second Council Directive. 62 The Second Directive applies
only to public companies and not to private companies."s The term "pub-
lic company" is defined to include the public company limited by shares,
limited by guarantee and having a share capital (United Kingdom, Ire-
land), die Aktiengesellschaft (Germany), la society anonyme (France,
Belgium), de naamloze venootschap ( Netherlands, Belgium), la societa
per azioni (Italy) and aktieselskabet (Denmark)." Member States need
not apply the Directive to investment companies with variable capital nor
to co-operatives, which take the form of public companies, if they require
these companies to mention their special status in their business
documents.6 5
Although article 43 of the Second Directive requires implementation
of the Directive in the national law of each Member State within two
Harmonization of Company Law: The First and Second Directives of the Council of Minis-
ters of the European Economic Community, AcrA JURIDICA 327, 327-328 (1978); Fr6d6ricq,
Harmonisatie van het vennootschapsrecht in de Europese Economische Gemeenschap,
hoever staan wij?, 43 RECHTSKUNDIG WEicLA, 1809, 1822-1823 (1980); Yates, III, supra
note 4, at 113-115.
.58. E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 56, art. 189.
59. Wooldridge, supra note 57, at 328.
60. See Nieuwdorp, Status Report on E.E.C. Company Law Harmonization, 12 INT'L
Bus. LAW. 425-430 (1984); Schneebaum, supra note 57, at 301-321; Fr6d6ricq, supra note 57,
at 1822-1840.
61. Where the subject of this article is not covered by any E.E.C. Directive, or where
otherwise useful, this article will refer to the law of the E.E.C. Countries with which the
author is most familiar.
62. Second Council Directive, supra note 3. For the legislative history of the Directive,
see Schmitthoff, The Second EEC Directive on Company Law, 15 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 43,
43-46 (1978).
63. Morse, supra note 4, at 127; Wooldridge, supra note 57, at 334; Schmitthoff, supra
note 62, at 45.
64. Second Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 1.1.
65. Id. art. 1.2.
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years of its notification, many Member States have implemented it much
later.6 6 The delay stems not from ideological rejection, but from the fact
that in some Member States a more general revision of the code was pro-
ceeding simultaneously, in some cases provoked by the implementation of
the Directive.6
7
1. Provisions for Corporation Distributions to Shareholders
The Second Directive provides special rules for the raising and main-
tenance of share capital that are much stricter than any "legal capital"
system in the United States. Article 6 of the Second Directive requires
that a public company may not be incorporated or authorized to com-
mence business unless a minimum capital of at least 25,000 European
Units of Account are subscribed." Member States often require a larger
minimum capital."9 Most E.E.C. Countries already had a requirement of a
minimum capitalization in their corporation law.
7 0
The Second Directive contains provisions to keep the minimum
amount, stated in the Directive and implemented in the national laws,
66. Schneebaum, supra note 7, at 304 n.46; Belgium, Law of December 5th, 1984,
MONrrEuR BELGE-BELGISCH STAATSBLAD, 15612 (Dec. 12, 1984); see Francois, van Bruys-
tegem, Massage, van Hulle, Debrulle, Verhaegen, Olivier essays in LA MODIFICATION DU
DROIT DES Socm'rEs ANONYMES, REVUE DE Dsorr COMMERCIAL BELGE (special edition) (1984)
[hereinafter cited as LA MODIFICATION BELGE]; Glansdorf, Projet de loi sur les sociktks com-
merciales, 101 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 171-176 (1982); France, Law of December 30th,
1981, 1982 J.C.P. 111 52152; Coffy, Loi No. 81-1162 du 30 dcembre 1981 relative a
l'harmonisation du droit des sociktks commerciales avec le lie. directive de la C.E.E. du 13
dicembre 1976, DALLOZ SiREY, CHRONIQUE 279, 279-292 (1982), and Guyon, La mise en
harmonie du droit francais des socistks avec la directive des Communaut~s Europkennes
sur le capital social, 1982 J.C.P. No. 1, 3067.
67. Massag6, Adaption des lois coordonnkes sur les socist~s commerciales a la Deux-
i~me directive des Communaut~s Europkennes relative a la constitution de la sociktk
anonyme, au maintien et aux modifications de son capital, 96 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 125,
125 (1981); Coffy, supra note 66, at 279.
68. The European Unit of Account is constituted by a "basket" of community curren-
cies and has been replaced by the European Currency Unit (ECU) in all Community legal
instruments. See Council Regulation 3308/80 of 16 Dec., 1980, 23 O.J. EvE. COMM. No.
L345, 1 (1980). The ECU is also a basket of currencies defined in the same way as the
European Unit of Account, but subject to a revision clause. See Council Regulation 3180/78
of 18 Dec. 1978, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. No. L 379, 1 (1978). The value of the ECU was approxi-
mately $0.88 on Jan. 21, 1986, Wall Street J. Jan. 21, 1986, at 55.
69. E.g., France, 250,000 FF, and 1,500,00 FF if the corporation "goes public;" see Y.
GUYON, DRorr DES AFFAIRES 270 (3rd. ed., Paris, 1984); Guyon, supra note 66, at No. 9;
Coffy, supra note 66, at 284. Belgium, 1,250,000 BF, See Francois, LA MODIICATION BELGE,
supra note 66, at 14. In Belgium there are no extra requirements as to minimum capitaliza-
tion when a firm goes public. The Belgian Commission Bancaire focuses especially on the
efficient disclosure to the prospective buyer. (Royal Decree nr. 185, July 9th, 1935); See
Geeraert, Keustermans, De openbare uitgifte van effecten, Recht en Praktijk, 19 JURA FAL-
CONIs 315, 315-355 (1983). Germany, 100,000 DM, see, Hdffer, Harmonisierung des ak-
tienrechtlichen Kapitalschutzes, 32 NEUB JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 1065, 1070 (1979).
70. E.g. France, art. 71, Law No. 66-537 of July 24th, 1966; Germany § 7 AKtG; Italy,
art. 2327 Codice Civile.
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adequate in the light of fluctuations of currencies and the economic and
monetary trends in the Member States 7 '
Shares issued for cash are paid at the time the company is incorpo-
rated or authorized to commence business, at not less than twenty-five
percent of their nominal value, or in absence of a nominal value, their
accountable par. Where shares are issued for a consideration other than
in cash, the consideration must be transferred in full within five years of
that time.
7 2
The subscribed capital may be formed only of assets capable of eco-
nomic assessment. Excluded are undertakings to perform work or supply
services."s Articles 10 and 11 of the Second Directive contain special rules
for the valuation of capital contributions in kind, including a requirement
for a valuation report, before the company is incorporated or authorized
to commence business, by one or more independent experts appointed or
approved by an administrative or judicial authority.7 Because the guid-
ing principle underlying this provision of the Second Directive is to estab-
lish the subscribed capital as the credit basis of the company for the pro-
tection of creditors, the articles concerning the maintenance of the
subscribed capital are as important as those concerning the raising of
capital.
Article 15 of the Second Directive is the core of the provisions en-
acted to maintain subscribed capital. Payments to shareholders of divi-
dends and interest relating to shares, and the permission to acquire its
own shares and redemptions 75 are subject to the following test, which is
similar to the "Balance Sheet Surplus Test":
Except for cases of reductions of subscribed capital, no distribution to
shareholders may be made when on the closing date of the last finan-
cial year the next assets as set out in the company's annual account
are, or following such a distribution would become, lower than the
amount of the subscribed capital plus those reserves which .may not
be distributed under the law or the statutes.
76
71. Second Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 6.2 and 6.3.
72. Second Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 9; The reason behind this rule is to
avoid unneeded assets in the corporation. In the beginning there is often no need for all the
money (or other assets) promised by the shareholders. The "unused" money would be a
(temporary) negative investment. See, J. RONSE, ALGEMEEN DazL VAN HET VENNOOTSCHAP-
SRECHT, 306 (Leuven, 1975); Y. GUYON, supra note 69, at 271.
73. Second Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 7. In the United States most courts and
statutes have imposed a similar prohibition. An agreement for future services is not accept-
able as a medium of payment to discharge the pay- in obligation of the shareholders. B.
MANNING, supra note 1, at 41.
74. In the United States, the board of directors has the responsibility for determining
the value of contributions in kind. According to most statutes their determination is (in the
absence of fraud) conclusive and determinative. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 44; Yates, III,
supra note 4, at 119.
75. Second Council Directive, supra note 3, arts. 15.1(d), 19.1(c), 35(b), 39(d).
76. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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Payments to shareholders of dividends and interest relating to shares and
redemptions are subject to a second test which is similar to the "Earned
Surplus Test":"
The amount of a distribution to shareholders may not exceed the
amount of the profits brought forward and sums drawn from reserves
available for this purpose, less any losses brought forward and sums
placed on reserve in accordance with the law or the statutes.
7 8
The directives contain many other detailed provisions on the with-
drawal of shares by purchase or redemption (for those Member States
where this is allowed), the reduction of subscribed capital and the main-
tenance of subscribed capital in general.7 9 Most of these are worth men-
tioning in order to give a more complete view of the provisions.
Article 17 of the Second Directive provides that the case of a serious
loss of the subscribed capital must give rise to a general meeting of share-
holders. The shareholders at this general meeting must then consider
whether the company should be wound up or whether other measures
should be taken. 0
Article 30 of the Second Directive provides that a reduction in the
subscribed capital must normally take place by a two-thirds majority vote
of the shareholders in a general meeting.8 ' The creditors whose claims
antedate the publication of the decision to make the reduction shall be
entitled to have the right to obtain security for claims which have not
fallen due at that time, if the reduction is due to over-capitalization."2 If
the reduction is to offset losses incurred, or to include sums of money in a
reserve (maximum ten percent of the reduced subscribed capital) the
amounts derived from the reduction may not be used for making pay-
ments or distributions to shareholders or discharging them from the obli-
gation to make their contributions.8 Article 34 of the Second Directive
provides that the subscribed capital may not be reduced to an amount
less than the minimum capital.
77. Second Council Directive, supra note 3, arts. 15.1(d), 35(b), 39(d).
78. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. See also van Hulle, Wettelijke
beperkingen inzake winstuitkering - Limitations lgales en matire de distribution des
bnfficres, in LA MODIFIcATMON BELGE, supra note 66, at 31, and Hackney, supra note 33, at
1363-1366 for a comparison of this test and the balance sheet surplus test.
79. Schmitthoff, supra note 62, at 51; See also Second Council Directive, supra note 3,
arts. 18-42.
80. See Debrulle, La responsabilit6 des administreurs en cas de perte grave du capital,
in LA MODIFICATION BELGE, supra note 66 at 105.
81. The notice concerning the meeting must specify at least the purpose of reduction
and the way in which it is to be carried out. Second Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 30.
82. Id. arts. 32, 33.1.
83. Id. art. 33.2. This dichotomy finds its origin in the legal systems of Germany (Wool-
dridge, supra note 57, at 340), the United Kingdom (Id. at 340 and Morse, supra note 4, at
131) and French law concerning commercial companies, art. 216; AKtG, art. 229; Companies
Act 1948, § 67.
1986
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
C. Other Rules Governing Distributions
Under Articles 34.1(b) and 37 of the Fourth Council Directive, a cor-
poration may not distribute dividends if the corporation has, where au-
thorized by national law, included organization expenses or expenses of
research and development under 'assets,' unless these expenses have been
completely written off, or if the amount of the reserves available for dis-
tribution and profits brought forward is at least equal to that of the ex-
penses not written off.
8 4
In the United States, General Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) s5 prescribe that expenses for research and development have to
be deducted at once and must not be recorded as assets.86 Organization
expenses, however, may generally be carried as assets written off as ex-
penses over a period not to exceed forty years.8 "
Some countries have national provisions which go further than the
minimum requirements of the Directives, for example, higher minimum
capitalization requirements. Other countries have imposed liability where
the corporation was undercapitalized. For example, article 35.6 of the
Belgian Consolidated Laws on Companies, assesses liability to the found-
ing shareholders in the event of bankruptcy within three years of the in-
corporation, if the capital was obviously insufficient to cover the proposed
activities of the corporation for an initial period of at least two years. The
judge will generally base his decision on a financial forecast furnished by
the founding shareholders to the notary at the time of incorporation.ss
IV. THE "CUSHION" OR "TRUST FUND" DOCTRINE
In many E.E.C. countries the requirements for minimum capital as a
84. Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54 (3)(g) of the Treaty,
on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. No L 222, 11
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Fourth Council Directive]. After implementation of the E.E.C.-
Directives these provisions and the provisions provided by the Second Council Directive are
part of article 77bis of the Belgian Consolidated Laws on Companies. See van Hulle, Wette-
lijke bescherming inzake winstuitkering - Limitations lgales en mati~re de distribution
des bn/fices, in LA MODIFICATION BFLGE, supra note 66, at 82.
85. General Accepted Accounting Principles [hereinafter referred to as GAAP] consist
of partially codified accepted practices of the accounting profession. The GAAP can be
found in the practice of the profession itself and in a collection of definitive publications,
e.g. by the American Institute of Certified Public Accounts (AICPA) and the Financial Ac-
counting Standard Board (FASB). See S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, supra note 12, at 6-7; T.
Finis, supra note 7, at 82-99.
86. Statement of Financial Accounting No. 2, Accounting for Research and Develop-
ment Costs, V 12 (FASB, 1974).
87. See T. FIFLIS, supra note 7, at 258-259, 270; S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, supra note 12,
at 71-72.
88. See generally Wymeersch, Oprichtersaansprakelijkheid bij inbreng van financieel
negatief vennootschapsvermogen, 22 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 2129, 2129-2146 (1979);
Breesch, Oprichting van N.V.'s en P.V.B.A.'s: enige cijfers en bedenkingen, 24 RECHT-
SKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 1625-1656 (1981).
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trust fund for general creditors have been increased by the implementa-
tion of the Directives. The idea of minimum capitalization has been com-
pletely abolished in the MBCA. This author suggests that a trust fund is
necessary for the protection of general creditors and that while some of
the existing solutions are promising, they all have defects. The use of fi-
nancial ratio tests is proposed as a better solution. Economic matters, in-
cluding valuation issues, however, must still be taken into consideration
when fixing the applicable ratios.
A. The Doctrine
The principal object of the legal capital systems in the United States,
as well as in the E.E.C., is to afford a margin of protection for creditors,8 9
in view of the limited liability of the shareholders. 90 While most financial
or institutional creditors can protect themselves against insolvent debt-
ors,91 general trade creditors cannot, as a practical matter, similarly pro-
tect themselves. 2
Provisions for the raising and maintenance of minimum capital can
protect creditors by reducing the probability of insolvency or bankruptcy,
and minimizing creditors' losses if either occurs.9" The theory behind the
idea of capital as protection for shareholders is the "trust fund" or "cush-
ion" doctrine.
The trust fund doctrine finds its origin in Wood v. Dummer." The
court in Drummer held that shareholders who received liquidating distri-
butions from an insolvent bank had to return these corporate assets for
distribution to their creditors, because the shareholders' equity is a "trust
fund" for creditors, and distributions out of capital were therefore illegal.
Justice Story stated:
The individual stockholders are not liable for the debts of the bank in
their private capacities. The charter relieves them from personal re-
89. Dividend regulations often include some protection of other parties: Either of the
shareholders against a diminution of their investment, or of one class of shareholders
against another. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 73; Hackney, supra note 33, at 1365; Task
Force Report, supra note 28, at 303.
90. Ralston, supra note 7, at 1019; T. Ftiws, supra note 7, at 524; Task Force Report,
supra note 28, at 303; Ackerman, Jr., Sterrett II, supra note 43, at 1052; Ronse, Kapitaal-
bescherming bij de oprichting -van de N.V., in DORHOUT MEEs COLLECTION, VERZEKERING
VAN VRIENDSCHAP, RECHTSGELEERDE OPSTELLEN AANGEBODEN AAN PROF. MR. T.J. DORHOUT
MEEs, 183, 184-185 (1974); Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporation Law
and Securities Regulations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 764-768 (1982); Yates, III, supra note 4,
at 118-119; Schmitthoff, supra note 62, at 48; Guyon, supra note 66, at No. 7.
91. E.g. by mortgage of real estate, pledge of securities or contractual limitations. See
B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 94-107.
92. Marsh, Jr., Introduction, Symposium, The New California General Corporation
Law, 23 UCLA L. REv. 1035, 1045 (1976); B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 91-94.
93. Gibson, Surplus So What? The Model Act Modernized, 17 Bus. LAW. 476, 485
(1962).
94. 30 F. Cas 435 (C.C.D.Me. 1824) (No. 17, 944).
1986
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
sponsibility, and substitutes the capital stock in its stead. . . . If the
stock may, the next day after it is paid in, be withdrawn by the stock-
holders without payment of the debts of the corporation, why is its
amount so studiously provided for, and its payment by the stockhold-
ers so diligently required? .... They [the stockholders] have the full
benefit of all the profits made by the establishment, and cannot take
any portion of the fund, until all the other claims on it are
extinguished.9'
Many states have enacted provisions which are premised on this theory to
protect creditors by limiting corporate -distributions to shareholders by
means of legal capital systems."6
B. General Evaluation of the Trust Fund Theory
For many years criticism has been directed against legal capital sys-
tems.97 The recent changes in the California General Corporation Code
and in the MBCA,9' were adopted because the general restrictions based
on legal capital were judged not to serve the original purpose of protect-
ing creditors, particularly general trade creditors." The MBCA has re-
acted against the perceived malfunctioning of the statutory system by
abolishing most of it. 00 A study of the criticism against the old statutory
systems in the light of the new MBCA is helpful in evaluating the new
provisions.
A criticism often mentioned is that legal capital does not refer to any
assets which the corporation actually owns as of the date of the balance
sheet. Rather, it refers to an abstract number that is obtained by multi-
plying the number of shares by the par value of each share, or in the case
of no par stock, to the number "stated" by the Board of Directors. 1 ' Be-
cause this number is unrelated to any economic facts relevant to credi-
tors, creditors prefer to rely on the assets and future prospects of the
95. Id. at 436.
96. Siegel, Accounting and Inflation: An Analysis and a Proposal, 29 UCLA L. Rav.
271, 318-319 (1982); Ralston, supra note 7, at 1021 and 1025; T. FIFLIS, supra note 7, at 432;
See supra notes 6-55 and accompanying text. In Europe, as well, capital is seen as a fixed
and "intangible" cushion for the protection of creditors. Tunc, supra note 90 at 768; J.
RONSE, supra note 72, at 299; Ronse, supra note 90, at 185-186; Massage, Capital social et
operations financibres - Maatschappelijk kapitaal en financiele verrichtingen, in LA MODI-
FICATION BELGE, supra note 66, at 53, 54; Guyon, supra note 66, at n. 7. See supra notes 62-
87 and accompanying text.
97. For a historical example, see Ballentine & Hills, Corporate Capital and Restric-
tions Upon Dividends Under Modern Corporation Laws, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 229, 258 (1935).
It is important to distinguish between the trust fund doctrine and different systems which
are often seen as implementations of the trust fund doctrine in corporation law.
98. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
99. Report of the Assembly Select Committee on the Revision of the Corporations
Code, 71 (1975); Amendments, supra note 5, at 1867.
100. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 8-39 and accompanying text. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 30;
Cohn, supra note 6, at 574; Ralston, supra note 7, at 1021.
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corporation as reflected by the entire range of information shown on con-
temporary balance sheets and income statements.'" 2
Legal capital on the balance sheet is not intended to show the
amount of the assets available to creditors. Rather, legal capital indicates
the assets which may not be distributed to shareholders. These assets can
only "leave" the company due to losses and they must be restored after
losses have been incurred before any distribution of assets to the share-
holders may take place.1 0 3 In fact it may be argued convincingly that
creditors do not look to capital accounts because the statutory legal capi-
tal systems are not efficient in raising and maintaining legal capital as a
trust fund large enough to protect creditors. This deficiency is another
reason why the "old" systems has been criticized.
The lack of independent valuation of capital contributions in kind,'0
the possibility of reducing stated capital by several devices (without ap-
proval of the creditors or without giving them any other protection), 0 5
the allowance of nimble dividends0 0 and the lack of any meaningful mini-
mum required capital' 07 are generally seen as major deficiencies of the
existing statutory legal capital systems.
In Europe these issues are resolved by requiring a valuation report
for capital contributions in kind (by one or more independent officially
approved experts), by limiting reductions of capital by severe rules, or by
forbidding any "nimble" dividends and requiring a minimum initial capi-
talization. In contrast, the MBCA has opted for the abolition of every-
thing that has some connection with legal capital, including the existence
of any trust fund for creditors."0 ' In one sweeping revision, the MBCA
thereby dealt with the often criticised complexity of the statutory legal
capital systems.'0 Consequently, under the MBCA more "economically
sensible transactions"'110 can be lawfully consummated than under the va-
rious statutory legal capital systems.
102. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 85; Cohn, supra note 6, at 575; Ralston, supra note
7, at 1026.
103. See supra notes 26, 75-78 and accompanying text. See also Siegel, supra note 96,
at 320.
104. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
105. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 86; Cohn, supra note 6, at 575; R. HAMILTON, supra
note 7, at 108; See supra notes 38, 83 and accompanying text.
106. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 86; T. FInis, supra note 7, at 434; Hackney, supra
note 24, at 800; See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text; Dreyfuss, supra note 43, at 840.
108. One could argue that if the assets of the corporation have a higher value (e.g. the
liquidation or market value) than the value used to determine the legality of dividends (e.g.
the book value), the difference between the two "values" constitutes a trust fund for credi-
tors. The opposite is true as well. All depend on the valuation methods used. Even if a
cushion exists in some cases under the MBCA, it doesn't appear to have been the purpose of
the drafters.
109. See B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 86.
110. Id. at 88.
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Nevertheless, the MBCA did not abolish all deficiencies."' As in the
legal capital systems, the decision power concerning distributions is still
in the hands of the board of directors which is elected by the sharehold-
ers." For important issues concerning the valuation of assets and ac-
counting principles used in order to prepare the balance which is the ba-
sis of the "balance sheet test," no clear rules are provided."'
One commentator made the following cogent remarks about the
"old" systems:
The most persuasive evidence of the quintessential triviality of the
system, however, lies in the fact that any corporation lawyer of mod-
erate skill can nearly always arrange things ... so as to make a lawful
shareholder distribution so long as insolvency is not the immediate
consequence.""
The MBCA has, by lowering the standards for legal distributions to
shareholders, made easier what already was possible (often after some ex-
pense) in some ineffective statutory legal capital systems. The dual insol-
vency test of the MBCA has the merit of simplicity. However, by prohib-
iting distributions where the ratio between total assets and total liabilities
is lower than one to one, the test is more likely to ascertain, than to pre-
dict insolvency (equitable or bankruptcy) as a consequence of the
distribution." 5
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act"' will often provide bet-
ter protection for creditors than the MBCA. While the MBCA is not spe-
cific about the method to be used to value the assets," 7 the UFCA deter-
mines the value of assets as the present fair saleable value.1'8 If the assets
have a lesser value under the UFCA method, than by a calculation
method under the MBCA then there can be "legal distributions" that are
"illegal conveyances" according to the UFCA. 9
111. Some of them are issues in any known system regulating distributions to
shareholders.
112. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 85 and 87; R. HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 108;
Marsh, Jr, supra note 91, at 1044.
113. See infra notes 139-160 and accompanying text.
114. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 87.
115. The two tests of the MBCA are more useful as a tool for litigation than as a means
for planning. R. JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS, 922 (5th ed. 1979); Ben-Dror,
supra note 41, at 381 and 395.
116. Unif. Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 74 U.L.A. 41 (1985) [hereinafter referred to as
UFCAJ, has been enacted in 26 states. The UFCA enables the trustee to recapture in some
circumstances for the benefit of creditors, funds distributed by debtors to others (e.g. share-
holders). See Clark, supra note 2, at 505; Kummert, supra note 1, at 271-275.
117. See infra 154-159 and accompanying notes.
118. UFCA supra note 116, § 2(1). The UFCA has no provision for liability of directors.
In contrast, the MBCA provides liability of directors in § 48. Does this difference justify the
application of different standards? See also Amendments, supra note 5, at 1882-1883; RE-
VIsED MODEL BusINEss CoRP. ACT 124 (1985), and R. JORDAN, W. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY,
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, 337-343 (unpublished, 1984).
119. The issue of accounting principles used, is extremely important in all systems reg-
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A trust fund is a conditio sine qua non for a serious and fair protec-
tion of creditors. A study has shown that even if a trust fund of twenty-
five percent of all the liabilities is required, many corporations can still
legally distribute assets to their shareholders one year prior to
bankruptcy.
120
Efficient rules for the raising and maintenance of a trust fund are
much more complex than the provisions of the MBCA. The European
system and the many complex rstrictive covenants imposed by finance
and institutional creditors 21 provide better protection for creditors than
the MBCA. The simplicity of the MBCA should not prevail over the fair-
ness and efficient protection brought by more elaborate solutions.
Whatever the capital is at incorporation, this amount should never
be paid to shareholders without the approval of creditors or without giv-
ing them security to protect their claims.'22 Even if the creditors get se-
curity or approve distributions out of capital1 2 3 to shareholders, the law
should require a minimum capital to be maintained in all cases in order
to protect future creditors. The same minimum amount should also be
required as a minimum initial capitalization before commencing activity
in corporate form. This requirement will provide a cushion for creditors
during the lifetime of the corporation. If the rules for the raising and
maintenance of this amount are efficient, the available protection will be
largely determined by the amount or ratio required as minimum
capitalization.
C. The Arbitrariness of the Trust Fund
The American statutory legal systems and the European corporation
laws have almost always required a fixed amount as minimal capitaliza-
tion.'2 4 The very low minimal capital requirement or the absense of any
requirement at all in the United States,1 25 is based on the notion that the
"old" statutes are seen as mere enabling acts, with no regulatory func-
tion. 2 ' In the early 1900s, courts came to deny limited liability to share-
holders if no reasonable amount of capital was in fact provided for the
ulating corporate distributions to shareholders.
120. Ben-Dror, supra note 41, at 395.
121. W. KLEIN, BusiNEss ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
160-166 (1980); B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 105-106; See supra note 91 and accompanying
text. Creditors often require that businesses be financed with a large enough equity cushion
(W. KLEIN, supra, at 49) or satisfy financial ratios (Ballantine & Hills, supra note 97, at
259).
122. See supra notes 62-83 and accompanying text.
123. It is clear that "distributions out of capital" means distributions of these assets
which form the counterpart of the legal capital on the balance sheet, and which cause the
total assets of the corporation to be less than the total liabilities plus the legal capital.
124. See supra notes 21, 68, 69 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 21 and 23.
126. Katz, The Philosophy of Midcentury Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CoNrlEM.
PROBS. 117, 179, 181-183 (1958); Hackney & Benson, supra note 15, at 856.
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protection of creditors.127 Undercapitalization became one of the principal
factors looked at by the courts as a reason to "pierce the corporate
veil. 1 2' The doctrinal basis for these decisons was the improper use of
the corporate form.1 29 However, courts do not automatically impose liabil-
ity for undercapitalization, but often look to equitable factors in deter-
mining whether to do so. ""
The law in this area is generally confused and many questions have
no clear answers.'s There is no assurance of economic viability for newly
formed corporate enterprises and courts limit the piercing of the corpo-
rate veil to extreme cases,1 - 2 in order to respect the principle of limited
liability. Although the concept of undercapitalization is in most cases a
difficult tool for corporate planning and protection of creditors, it should
be maintained as a device of last resort.
A larger than nominal "fixed" amount of minimal required capitali-
zation, as in Europe, certainly gives better protection to creditors, but the
larger the corporation, the less protection a fixed amount will provide.
The minimal capital requirement is therefore not an entirely satisfactory
solution.
In order to have an efficient rule for small and large corporations, the
use of financial ratios should be considered. California was the first state
to use a combination of financial ratios as a mechanism for regulating
corporate distributions.33 Under California Corporation Law, a corpora-
tion may make distributions in excess of retained earnings if it can meet
two financial ratio tests.'" This test to evaluate the solvency and stability
of a corporation1 35 is commonly referred to as a "bankruptcy prediction
model."18 6 Under the California Corporation Code, however, it is still pos-
127. See e.g., Oriental Inv. Co. v. Barclay, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 543, 64 S.W. 80 (1901).
128. Note, Inadequate Capitalization as a Basis for Shareholder Liability: The Cali-
fornia Approach and a Recommendation, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 823, 824 (1972); Hackney &
Benson, supra note 14, at 854.
129. H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS, § 129 at 302-303 (1946); Hackney &
Benson, supra note 14, at 854 and 857. Worthwhile to mention here is section 5 of the
UFCA (See supra note 118), which forbids gratuitous or unfair transfers by a business
debtor when the transferor would be left with an unreasonable small capital. This is, how-
ever, different from the requirement for initial capitalization. Clark, supra note 2, at 540.
See also Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1982). These provisions
have not been enforced vigorously, and there are only a few cases. Hackney & Benson, supra
note 14, at 860-861 n.105. See also note 88 and accompanying text.
130. Hackney & Benson, supra note 14, at 885 and 901; Note, supra note 128, at 830.
131. Hackney & Benson, supra note 14.
132. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 17-18 n.2. For examples see Hackney & Benson,
supra note 14, at 891-898.
133. Ben-Dror, supra note 41, at 377.
134. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text. CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(b) (Deering
1977).
135. § 500(b) attempts to predict bankruptcy by using a predictive factor of one quar-
ter into the total assets ratio, i.e. total assets 11/4 times total liabilities.
136. Ben-Dror, supra note 42, at 376. The fact that these ratio tests only have to be
satisfied under California Law for distributions in excess of retained earnings means that no
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sible to make distributions of retained earnings, even if the two tests are
not met. Corporate assets can still be distributed to shareholders without
leaving a trust fund for present and future creditors, as long as the distri-
butions consist of earnings. Protection for general creditors against distri-
bution of assets, whether made out of earnings or not, has to be condi-
tional on compliance with the financial ratio tests.
The model used should be applicable to all corporations, regardless
of size or industry. The most efficient ratio of capital versus leverage (lia-
bilities), however, depends on many factors, such as the industry charac-
teristics, the growth rate and stability of sales, the assets structure, man-
agement and lenders attitudes.13 7 It would be too complex to provide
different rules for different sizes or kinds of industries. In order to en-
hance the practical application, a simple standard model is preferable.
Simplicity, high prediction rates and low overprediction rates should be
taken into account according to their respective importance. The require-
ment of a fixed minimum capitalization, 1 the use of a bankruptcy pre-
diction model, and as a last resort, the doctrine of misuse of the corporate
entity, provides a better standard for shareholders, directors and credi-
tors than any existing system.
D. Valuation Issues
Regardless of which requirements or tests regulating corporate distri-
butions are imposed by law, no system will provide a clear rule if there
are no provisions concerning the definition and methods for the valuation
of assets.1 " There are different valuation methods that have different ef-
fects on the amount of protection available for creditors. 140 Many states
use the term "assets," but most do not resolve the fundamental question
of their valuation. Moreover, courts offer little guidance in the valuation
financial solvency has to be present to pay distributions out of retained earnings. See Cal
CORP. CODE § 500(a) (Deering 1977). The requirements of §500(a) and (b) should be cumula-
tive instead of alternative.
137. See J. WESTON & T. COPELAND, MANAGERIAL FINANCE, ch. 20 (8th ed. 1985). The
California Corporation Code ratio of assets 11/4 times liabilities could give problems in in-
dustries where high leverage is common and economically sensible.
138. A fixed amount should be maintained in order to avoid that big risks are taken by
very small "corporations" that fulfill the tests, but have no reasonable trust fund available
to cover losses.
139. See B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 62; Hackney, supra note 24, at 801; Hackney,
supra note 33, at 1371.
140. Different "values" include: liquidating value, going concern value, book value, mar-
ket value, fair or reasonable value. See J. WESTON & T.CoPELAND, supra note 137, ch. 23.
For example, if the book value of the assets is smaller than their going concern value (e.g.
because fast depreciation is allowed), creditors are better protected when the book value is
used to determine the minimal capital requirements, than when the going concern value
would be used. In the latter case, creditors would have only a little cushion or none at all if
the corporation were forced to liquidate, because the liquidating value often is smaller than
the going concern value.
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of assets. 4"
Searching for clear and detailed rules on the valuation of assets, au-
thors have often referred to GAAP'4 2 for general guidance.'48 Yet, because
GAAP often provides a choice of method, it gives no guarantee of cer-
tainty in financial determinations.1
44
GAAP, however, is much more clear than the "old" laws which, in
requiring that financial statements be made in a reasonable manner, leave
resolution of accounting matters to judgment under a common law of un-
certain content and application." Another important advantage of
GAAP is its continuous adaptation in response to changes in economic
and social conditions, new knowledge and technology, and to demands of
users for more serviceable financial information.
1 46
Some states have taken a step to provide better protection for credi-
tors by requiring valuation of assets according to GAAP.147 In Europe,
similar considerations supported the enactment of the Fourth Council Di-
rective on the annual accounts of limited liability companies. 4 ' The
Fourth Council Directive contains detailed instruction on valuation meth-
ods in section seven which is entitled "valuation rules. 1 49 The Directive
also establishes a "contact committee" which will facilitate the harmo-
nized application of the Directive and advise the European Commission
141. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 62; S. SIEE. & D. SIEGEL, supra note 12, at 99;
Siegel, supra note 96, at 319-320; Ballantine & Hills, supra note 97, at 259. It is a very
difficult task for a legislature or a court to establish principles for the valuation of assets.
Hackney, Corporate Law Aspects of Some Recent Developments in Accounting, 3 J. L. &
CoM. 1 (1983).
142. See supra note 85.
143. Siegel, A Critical Examination of State Regulation of Accounting Principles, (un-
published, 1985); B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 61-62; Hackney, supra note 24, at 797 and
823.
144. Ackerman, Jr., supra note 43, at 1080.
145. Id.; Siegel, supra note 96, at 321-322.
146. APB No. 4, ch. 9, 1 2-3 (1970).
147. See e.g. North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-2(2), 55-49(b)(1982), Michigan
(Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 450.1110 (1973), Maryland (MD. CORP. & ASSNS CODE ANN. § 1-
402 (1982), California (CAL. CORP. CODE § 114 (Deering (1977)). B. MANNING, supra note 1
at 62 n.7; S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, supra note 12, at 99; Task Force Report, supra note 28, at
294; Dreyfuss, supra note 43, at 845; Ackerman, Jr., supra note 43, at 1065, 1081; Siegel,
supra note 96, at 319 n.156; Hackney, supra note 141, at 12. Siegel, supra note 143, n.6.
148. See supra note 85. "Whereas the coordination of national provisions concerning
the presentation and content of annual accounts and annual reports, the valuation methods
used therein and their publication in respect to certain companies with limited liability is of
special importance for the protection of members and third parties." (emphasis added)
Statement of legislative purpose, Fourth Council Directive, supra note 85. For an overview
of all "accounting directives" (Fourth; Seventh, adopted 13 June 1983, and Eighth, adopted
13 March 1984), see van Hulle, The EEC Accounting Directives in Perspective: Problems of
Harmonization, 18 COMM. MKT. L. REv.121 (1981); Schneebaum, supra note 57, at 305-307
and 310-317; Nieuwdorp, supra note 60, at 426-430.
149. Fourth Council Directive, supra note 84, art. 31-42. Schneebaum, supra note 57, at
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on additions or amendments to the Directive15 in order to follow ac-
countancy developments in Member States.'
Section 6.40(d) of the new MBCA provides that determinations of
corporate assets may be based upon financial statements prepared on the
basis of accounting practices and principles of a fair valuation or any
other method that is reasonable in the circumstances.' 52 While these "rea-
sonable" principles are not necessarily consistent with GAAP,113 the
drafters expect that their use will be the basic rule in most cases.' The
statutory language, however, requires an informed business judgment in
the choice of the accounting principles used,15 5 and commentary to the
Revised MBCA suggests that, in most cases, "going concern" value would
be the appropriate method in determining the value of the assets.'"
These "guidelines" are of little help to directors, and the commen-
tary by the drafters of the MBCA makes quite clear they are not in-
tended to constitute a safe harbor for them.5 7 The broad business judg-
ment rule on the other hand provides little protection for creditors. 5 8
Directors and creditors would be better off if state laws provided a safe
harbor for directors consisting of a dividend test exercised in good faith
reliance on financial statements prepared in conformity with GAAP.'59
An informed business judgment should only be required if the GAAP
provide an important choice or if no solution for a specific problem is
given.
V. CONCLUSION
The comparative overview and analysis of the United States and
150. Fourth Council Directive, supra note 84, art. 52.
151. van Hulle, supra note 148, at 129. For the development of the Belgian accounting
law, see de Lembre, Boekhoudrecht in Belgie: ontstaan en evolutie, 16 TuDSCHRIr VOOR
PRIVAATRECHT 401, 401-437 (1979); Lemaitre, RWforme de ta comptabilit6 et des comptes
annuels des enterprises beiges, 34 REvuE TRIMESTRiELLE DE Daorr COMMERCIALE 627, 627-
680 (1981); van Crombrugge, Boekhoudrecht en boekhoudtheorie, 18 "uSCHRiaT Vooa
PRIVAATRECHT 973, 973-1021 (1981).
152. For a more extensive discussion of these provisions of the MBCA, see Siegel, supra
note 143, nn.28-32 and accompanying text.
153. Goldstein & Hamilton, The Revised Model Business Corporations Act, 38 Bus.
LAW. 1019, 1021 (1983).
154. REVISED MODEL BusiNEss Coau,. Acr § 6.40(d) (1985).
155. Id.
156. Amendments, supra note 5, at 1885.
157. Id. at 1884; Task Force Report, supra note 28, at 301.
158. Problems arise in connection with goodwill and reappraisal of fixed assets as fac-
tors taken in account by the directors in determining the legality of dividends. Cohn, supra
note 6, at 577.
159. See Siegel, supra note 143, 17-20. See also Task force report, supra note 28, at
302-303; Hackney, supra note 141, at 32-34. In Belgium, accounts prepared according to
"general accepted accounting principles" (similar in many aspects to the GAAP of the
U.S.A.), provide a safe harbor for directors by creating the presumption that they give a
true and fair view of the corporation's financial situation. See van Crombrugge, supra note
151, at 998-999.
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E.E.C. financial provisions concerning distributions to shareholders has
shown that none of the existing systems provide sufficient protection to
general creditors of a corporation. The best way to achieve reliable pro-
tection is to provide a system which combines a fixed minimum capitali-
zation (which should be high enough to give at least some protection by
itself) and the use of a financial ratio test (bankruptcy prediction model).
All distributions would have to be made subject to the minimum capitali-
zation requirement and the financial ratio tests, even if the distributions
are earnings. Those earnings which may not be legally distributed under
the system will create a solid trust fund in case of thin initial
capitalization.
Because there are different ways to value an asset, the proposed sys-
tem can only be made efficient by enactment or referral to detailed ac-
counting principles for their valuation. While the E.E.C. countries have
chosen to enact accounting principles through the Seventh Directive, a
referral to the GAAP could fulfill this task in the United States.
The E.E.C. countries should improve their systems by enactment of
financial ratios as dividend tests. The existing system of minimum capi-
talization only provides protection to general creditors of small corpora-
tions. Financial ratio tests will provide adequate protection to creditors of
large corporations as well.
In the United States, the new MBCA has made a step in the right
direction by eliminating some outmoded concepts and adopting a finan-
cial ratio test. The assets-liability ratio requirement of one to one, and
the absence of detailed accountancy rules certainly diminished the com-
plexity of the dividend regulating system. Unfortunately, the MBCA also
brought protection for general creditors down to a meaningless level.
Nevertheless, the revisers of the MBCA are in a perfect position to adopt
the proposed solution. The proposed system probably will be more com-
plex than today's MBCA, but in these matters, simplicity should not pre-
vail over efficiency.
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